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Abstract
 The maritime situation in East Asia is currently a focus of the world attention 
primarily because China’s assertive, ‘expansionist’ behaviour is said to have tightened 
tensions in the region. In the author’s opinion, one cannot blame China alone for the 
current tension in and around the East and South China Seas. 
 The aim of this paper is to examine the applicability of the law of the sea, including 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea （UNCLOS）, in settling territorial 
and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. The focus of discussion therein 
is on the following three points: first, China’s position as a challenger or a revisionist 
in terms of the current rules of international maritime law; second, the relevance of 
history and historical factors in applying the current rules; and third, theory and reality of 
interpretation and application of the current rules in East Asia. 
 This paper concludes by raising the following three points: first, the law of the sea is 
not perfect to settle all maritime conflicts and disputes in the East and South China Seas 
between states concerned, let alone the territorial disputes; second, the law of the sea does 
not directly and precisely govern historical matters, such as historic waters and historical 
rights; and third, to settle a territorial and maritime dispute, peaceful and direct talks 
between the parties concerned should be a basic threshold.
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Introduction
 The maritime situation in East Asia is currently a focus of the world 
attention primarily because China’s assertive, ‘expansionist’1 behaviour is said 
to have tightened tensions in the region.2 Having grown as a rising power in 
a setting of economic development and military enhancement, particularly in 
this millennium, China’s behaviour is regarded by many as provocative and 
threatening.3
 In the author’s opinion, however, one cannot blame China alone for the 
current tension in and around the East and South China Seas.4 This is par-
ticularly so when the mass media are more or less under the strong influence 
of some nationalistic voice of a country and the people are, to a certain degree, 
biased through the lenses of western-centric glasses.5
 Having had the opportunity to present his analysis of the disputes con-
cerning the South China Sea and the East China Sea over the course of sev-
eral years,6 the current author presents this paper to examine the applicability 
of the law of the sea, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea （UNCLOS）,7 in settling territorial and maritime disputes in the East 
and South China Seas. To minimise the overlapping of issues to be addressed, 
the focus of discussion herein is on the following three points: first, China’s 
position as a challenger or a revisionist in terms of the current rules of inter-
national maritime law; second, the relevance of history and historical factors 
in applying the current rules; and third, theory and reality of interpretation 
and application of the current rules in East Asia. 
Ⅰ．China as a Challenger to the Current Legal Regime
 As it grows, China has become a power to make a maritime claim to 
defend its own national interest.8 It does not need to stay quiet in front of 
other countries’ offensive and/or unfriendly actions in the maritime area off 
its coast or in the aerial zone above its territorial sea. This can be said under 
international law.9 The status quo may not necessarily be favourable for China 
in terms of the legal situations in the East China Sea and South China Sea, 
in particular.10 The issuance of a new map of the whole territory claimed by 
China, for example, can be considered in this context,11 even though the legal 
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significance of this conduct may be limited in practice. 【MAP 1】
 In fact, it may be commonly understood that, ‘in accord with practical 
realities’, the ‘common consent’ of the members of an international commu-
nity is regarded as the basis of international law.12 This observation leads to 
the following: 
［N］o state can at some time or another declare that it will in future no 
longer submit to a certain recognised rule of international law. The body 
of the rules of this law can be altered by the generally agreed procedures 
only, not by a unilateral declaration on the part of one state. This applies to 
all rules other than those created by treaties which admit of denuncia-
tion or withdrawal.13 （emphasis added）
【MAP １】
［Source］ http://pic.people.com.cn/n/2014/0625/c1016-25196781.html （accessed 30 September 2014）
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 There is, however, no explicit legal rule that forever prohibits a state 
from taking a recalcitrant behaviour against unfavourable situations or meas-
ures for itself, even though it is nowadays frequently said that, under interna-
tional law, a unilateral action14 with force must not be taken in order to change 
the status quo for its favour.15 In the context of this paper, the passage cited 
above may only apply when one can clearly answer the following questions: 
first, do the states concerned in the territorial and maritime disputes really 
have ‘a certain recognised rule’ applicable in the East and South China Seas?; 
and second, what are the ‘generally agreed procedures’ to alter the body of the 
rules in question? It does not seem to be easy to answer these questions under 
the current situations. 
 Some surrounding countries exhibit negative feeling about China’s ex-
panding presence in the maritime area in and near the South and East China 
Seas.16 This sense of a threat or suspicion towards China’s attitude and behav-
iour in this region may sometimes be derived from ignorance, misperception, 
and prejudice of the states and people concerned.17 China now has the second 
largest economy in the world,18 with a history, tradition, culture and civiliza-
tion of ‘several millennia’;19 the size of its area is over 9,500,000 square km, 
and its population is over 1.3 billion.20 Its geographic and demographic factors 
easily affect regional as well as international matters.21 Moreover, what is often 
overlooked is the arguably unprecedented phenomenon of China’s rising as a 
huge power, comparable to the United States, at least in this region.22
 In the author’s opinion, communist China, as a returning （quasi super-）
power rising from a ‘sleep’ of more than 150 years, has been gradually chal-
lenging, if not rectifying, some parts of the current legal order, or status quo, 
in the maritime area surrounding its country.23 This perspective may explain 
what is normally neglected or unknown in the debate from Western points of 
view. The following argument is noteworthy:
Commentators often use the expression “Westphalian sovereignty” 
when discussing national sovereignty, thus revealing how significant a 
role the Peace of Westphalia （1648） plays in the Western concept of 
political authority and international relations. The treaties that created 
the Peace of Westphalia were signed at the end of the Thirty Years War 
in the area known as Westphalia, currently the modern-day provincial 
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state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. Westphalia is a long way 
from the Forbidden Palace in Beijing. Why should Westphalian sover-
eignty, the Western concept of sovereignty, apply to an entity that had 
existed some 3,000 years before the Peace of Westphalia, and thousands 
of miles away? 24
 Therefore, it would not be correct to think that people in the Eastern 
countries and those in the Western countries completely share the same views 
of history and values.25
 China’s position may be understandable if one turns one’s eyes to the 
precedence of the United States with respect to the Truman Proclamation26 
of 28 September 1945 regarding the continental shelf and its resources.27 On 
the basis of ‘contiguity and reasonableness’,28 the United Sates unilaterally 
initiated state practice concerning the development and exploitation of the 
resources of the continental shelf of its coast under the circumstance where 
there had been no such precedent. 
 It is usually understood that this unilateral act of the US was a remark-
able and invaluable pioneering act, which led to the creation of customary law 
regarding the legal concept of the continental shelf in international law.29 This 
is mainly because the US Proclamation was ‘followed by similar claims made 
by many other States’ （with the belief that they were permissible in interna-
tional law’.30 The US’s unilateral act of the Proclamation was founded in a 
state of legal vacuum, that is, a situation where there had been no applicable 
legal rules or standards to govern the idea of the continental shelf and its re-
sources under international law.31
 In comparison, China seems to have a different position with respect 
to the territorial and maritime matters in the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea. As Mark J. Valencia argues:
［T］he legal purists who think international law is absolute and un-
changing and are wedded to the status quo – which favors Western 
powers – will criticize this position. But the reality is that ‘international 
law is the arms of geopolitics’ and its evolution and interpretation will 
be influenced by rising nations – just as they have been influenced by 
today’s ‘global leaders’. For China such a statement would indicate it has 
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“risen” and is ready to challenge the existing world system and con-
temporary interpretations of international law – if necessary to protect 
its interests.32
 Therefore, China does not appear to be trying to create a new rule 
through its state practice, but rather, to challenge the current unreasonable and 
inconvenient situation for itself by way of legal interpretation and application. 
 This can be also said with respect to the law of the sea. For example, 
one of the most controversial issues surrounding the exclusive economic zone 
（EEZ） is the relationship between the freedom of navigation exercised by the 
flag state and the exercise of jurisdiction of the coastal state in its EEZ under 
Article 5833 of UNCLOS.34 The question here is whether military activities in 
other states’ EEZ are permissible without consent of those states.35 Similarly, 
the issue of conducting marine scientific research （MSR） in other states’ 
EEZ is also controversial because some coastal states require other states to 
obtain their consent in conducting MSR in their EEZ under Article 24636 of 
UNCLOS. 
 As regards these issues, China and the US have been opposed to each 
other.37 The US position regarding these issues is that all states will continue 
to enjoy the right to conduct military activities, including oceanographic sur-
vey and surveillance activities, in the EEZ because these activities have always 
been regarded as ‘internationally lawful uses of the sea’.38 In this connection, 
it is also suggested that ‘all forms of marine data collection should be under 
coastal State control would deprive the people of all nations of the benefits 
of free and open access to data that enhance safety and environmental pro-
tection’.39 However, China, as a coastal state, considers that other countries 
that conduct MSR in its EEZ need consent from it under Article 246 of 
UNCLOS.40 The US and those that want to conduct MSR and other sur-
veys of any kind in other countries’ EEZ have the freedom to do so, and are 
not regulated by coastal states.41 The latter group of countries, including the 
US, take the view that MSR and surveying conducted in the territorial sea 
are not explicitly forbidden during the exercise of innocent passage in Part 
II of UNCLOS, while Part XIII does not govern hydrographic and military 
surveys.42
 A real and unforgettable recent conflict between these different 
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positions was the dangerous USNS Impeccable incident of 2009,43 in which 
the ocean surveillance vessel operating 75 nm south of China’s Hainan island 
within the EEZ claimed by China had to take avoidance action to avoid colli-
sion with China’s state-owned vessels due to their ‘harassing’.44 What was at 
issue in the incident is the legality of the US ship’s operation in China’s ‘special 
economic zone’ in the South China Sea without China’s permission. 
 In connection with this incident, some writers states that ‘［t］he point 
of distinction between the Chinese and United States position on these issues 
is whether a non-resource related activity in the EEZ such as military marine 
data collection is a form of marine scientific research subject to coastal state 
regulation or whether this is a legitimate freedom of the seas’.45 These issues 
are also concerned with the question of what is meant by ‘normal circum-
stances’ under Article 246, paragraph 3,46 of UNCLOS.47 Some writers main-
tain that ‘［p］roviding these military activities fall beyond the scope of Article 
246 marine scientific research and there is no direct threat posed to the 
coastal state which would legitimately activate the right of self-defence then 
military-related survey activities in the EEZ are consistent’ with UNCLOS 
and international law.48 As regards the question of the interpretation of ‘nor-
mal circumstances’, one view is that ‘circumstances are “normal” except where 
there is hostility or serious tension between the coastal State and the research-
ing State’.49 
 It is not easy, however, to judge whether military-related survey activi-
ties in the EEZ are compatible with UNCLOS50 and international law in a 
practical case. One may wonder what is meant by a ‘direct threat’ and by ‘hos-
tility or serious tension’, for example. No matter what sort of hydrographic or 
military surveying is conducted, the subjective factors of the conductor, such 
as intention and motivation, cannot easily be identified by coastal states. The 
conducting of surveys for any purposes, even in the name of freedom of navi-
gation to challenge excessive coastal state maritime claims,51 may be deemed 
to be unfriendly and suspicious by the coastal states, particularly when the 
relationship between the conducting state and the coastal state is at stake with 
very little confidence in each other. Accordingly, the question here is whether 
China and the US have confidence with each other or not. In this sense, it is 
noteworthy that the US-China Memorandum of Understanding （MOU） on 
the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters52 has 
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been announced to deal with this issue and other related matters, although 
this may be a small step for the future of the two powers due to several 
weaknesses.53 
 Another good example of a conflict arising from different interpreta-
tions of UNCLOS and other related international legal norms is China’s 
declaration54 of an Air Defence Identification Zone （ADIZ） in the East 
China Sea in 2013.55 【MAP 2】　Although as many as 20 states had already 
declared similar ADIZs for security purposes before China’s declaration,56 
this was shocking and unwelcomed by its neighbouring states, as well as the 
US,57 for its peculiar function of military enforcement in expressing China’s 
will to ‘adopt defensive emergency measures’58 against uncooperative or 
non-obedient aircraft. ADIZs themselves are not very well founded under 
【MAP ２】
［Source］http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-11/23/content_4476911.htm
 (accessed 30 September 2014)
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international law,59 though there has been similar precedence followed by 
some countries who share nearly the same purpose, that is, national security, 
or the prevention of threats to peace.60
 This kind of military responsive actions taken by a coastal state may 
seem to be incompatible with the freedom of overflight included in the free-
dom of the high seas under Article 87 （1） of UNCLOS.61 However, this 
point is controversial, and not easily resolved among opponents. First, whether 
this sort of ADIZ is legal or not depends, in particular terms, on how the 
coastal state implements the defensive measures in reality, even though the 
declaration in question may have a chilling effect on the states concerned. 
Second, under the circumstances that national security may be under great 
peril and danger before an eminent urgent situation due to the remarkable 
development of military technology, relevant rules in international law are 
not definitively clear-cut. Third, UNCLOS, to which the US is not yet party, 
will still be dependent on the consequent practice of the states concerned, as 
UNCLOS parallels customary law.62
 China’s unilateral action may be untimely and unfriendly for the politi-
cal environment in East Asia,63 but it is not necessarily illegal or unfounded 
under international law. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the 
United States ‘established the first ADIZ during the Cold War to manage 
the air threat from the Soviet Union’64 in the region in question. Therefore, 
China’s challenge to the status quo of the overflight in the East China Sea 
by setting the overlapping and, reputedly, more assertive ADIZ in the mari-
time area cannot be refuted as illegal, but must be regarded as an act to level 
its status as the power who actually rules the region, i.e. the United States.65 
Understandably, a formerly quiet, docile actor may alter its behaviour and at-
titude in accordance with its growth and development, as well as changing 
domestic and international circumstances.
Ⅱ．Historical Factors and the Law of the Sea
 Regarding the issue of historic waters or historic rights under the law 
of the sea, UNCLOS refers to ‘historic bay’ and ‘historic title’ in Articles 10, 
15, and 298 （1） （a）.66 These concepts are often introduced by some writers 
in relation to the claim of China with respect to the South China Sea, and 
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they are, in fact, controversial concepts.67 There may be some countries such 
as China that interpret these provisions as embodying the ‘recognition and 
respect’ of the ‘historical rights’.68 However, this issue is not easily resolved 
because UNCLOS itself does not say anything significant with respect to the 
definition, standard, and criteria of these terms concerning history.
 As is well known, the claim to historic waters incurs great risk in inter-
national relations, as there has long been huge debate over the concept itself.69 
Normally, the following three requirements must be met for historic waters 
to be recognised: first, the coastal states’ exercise of title in the region in ques-
tion; second, continuity of the period of exercising this competence; and third, 
the attitude of other foreign countries towards the claim of historic waters70. 
However, what lies at the bottom of the concept of historic waters is the idea 
that an original matter based on what is initially ‘an illegal situation’ under 
the legal system valid at that time subsequently becomes valid or complete, 
not only by the lapse of time, but also by the acquiescence of the legitimate 
possessor or toleration by, other countries.71 The concept of historic water is 
not considered as an established legal principle under international law, be-
cause one cannot easily ascertain who the original legitimate possessor is, or 
how to evaluate the existence and form of any acquiescence.72
 However, there is still an argument regarding the legal foundation of 
the legality or illegality of conduct in the context above, as discussed below. 
The UNCLOS provisions that refer to ‘historic bays’ and ‘historic rights’ also 
leave ambiguity in their interpretation.73 It is certainly difficult to claim that 
the South China Sea is a normal bay, and whether the South China Sea is a 
historic bay is also a controversial issue, perhaps with a negative result. Judging 
from the Preamble of UNCLOS,74 with the relevance of history, these con-
cepts will certainly be ‘governed by general international law’, that is, custom-
ary international law. Again, however, the rules of customary international law 
concerning these concepts are also unclear, and not necessarily defined.
 As judicial precedent of the International Court of Justice （ICJ） 
shows,75 each individual case is recognized as unique.76 In other words, there 
is no almighty legal criterion or standard to apply and operate with respect 
to historic waters. Therefore, one should normally check the following ques-
tions, among others: to what extent has a claimant state exercised its juris-
diction within the maritime area in question; whether, in the course of these 
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actions, there has been any protest from other countries; and how far state 
practice has gone in comparison with that of other countries. China may also 
need to clarify these questions, if it wants to be considered as a legitimate 
claimant.77
 One writer suggests that among the historic rights are rights to fishing 
that has been conducted for a long time by Chinese fishermen, for example.78 
While maritime area that does not fall into the category of the EEZ or the 
continental shelf may be entitled to the same legal status as the area of the 
EEZ and the continental shelf and their subsoil, maritime area where ‘histori-
cal rights’ are claimed can exceed 200 nautical miles and will be, even within 
200 nautical miles, subject to domestic laws and regulations different from 
those of the EEZ regime.79 Another writer suggests that China has used a 
combination of the concept of sovereign rights in the EEZ and the conti-
nental shelf under UNCLOS with the concept of ‘historical rights’ to claim 
all the living and non-living resources within the so-called nine dash line （or 
U-shaped line） that China uses in the South China Sea.80 
 Some Chinese officials have referred to the concept of historic rights 
to the effect that the dashed line is what China’s sovereignty rights over the 
South China Sea have established and developed ‘in the long process of his-
tory’.81 China seems to be of the opinion that there had been no criticism or 
protest from foreign countries even after the publication of the map on which 
the dashed line was drawn. Some commentators concur, adding the phrases 
‘throughout recorded history’ and that passage of ‘［t］hose rights do not 
derive from UNCLOS’.82 However, it is not easy to judge whether there had 
been tolerance or acquiescence by the international community, including the 
states concerned about China’s unilateral actions, such as publication of the 
map containing the dashed line mentioned above.
 In the discussion of the International Law Commission （ILC）, ‘historic 
bay’ was widely pointed out as a concept that was disadvantageous to coun-
tries with shorter histories, but advantageous to those with longer ones.83 At 
any rate, it is not easy to find a rule of international law that governs the ‘his-
torical rights’ of China. Under these circumstances, the legality or illegality 
of China’s claim regarding the historical rights within the dashed line in the 
South China Sea is widely open for further discussion.
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Ⅲ．Theory and Reality of the Application of an Agreed
　　Framework
 It may be often thought that bilateral and regional fishery agreements 
complement UNCLOS, and that they serve the regional interest in fisher-
ies. In fact, UNCLOS, as an umbrella agreement, needs regional and bilateral 
agreements to facilitate and ensure implementation of the rules and norms in 
the maritime areas in question.84 It is not impossible for two opposing states 
engaged in a territorial and/or maritime dispute to reach an agreement on 
fisheries by shelving the territorial/maritime dispute. 
 However, a state-state relationship through a bilateral agreement does 
not necessarily turn out to be favourable or beneficial to the people domesti-
cally. In other words, the local people’s interest in fisheries, for example, may 
be sacrificed under the guise of a friendly relationship between the two state-
parties. A state may neglect or turn a blind eye to the interests of fishermen, 
weighing more of the national interest in strategic and geopolitical inter-state 
relations.
 A typical example might be the fisheries agreement signed by Japan 
and Taiwan in April 2013.85 As Japan does not recognise Taiwan as a sover-
eign state due to its （and Taiwan’s） relations with mainland China, the 2013 
Fisheries Agreement is not a state-state agreement but an agreement between 
a state and an entity without statehood （through civil agencies）, strictly 
speaking.86 The Fisheries Agreement allows fishing vessels from both parties 
to operate for the first time in more than forty years in disputed waters of vast 
size near the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Tiaoyutai Islands. 【MAP 3】This achieve-
ment was initially hailed and welcomed officially, at least by the two parties, 
as a successful symbol of diplomatic, peaceful but time-consuming dialogue 
between the two, despite the existence of the territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Tiaoyutai Islands.87 Sidestepping the issue arising from 
both parties’ overlapping EEZs, the Agreement has introduced ‘special coop-
erative waters’ in which fishermen of both parties may enter and fish under 
certain conditions.
 In effect, however, it is too early to say that this agreement has brought 
about peace in the maritime area where both parties’ fishermen should share 
catches through fishing in a mingled way.88 The agreement did not prescribe 
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【MAP ３】
［Source］http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/979/The%20Taiwan-Japan%20
Fisheries%20Agreement%20(illustrated%20pamphlet).PDF (Accessed 30 September 2014)
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minute and detailed rules and regulations, but left them to bilateral consulta-
tions in a joint commission.89 Unfortunately, a series of the consultations has 
not been very successful to date, and has produced little fruit. Moreover, it has 
been reported that the Japanese fishermen of the maritime area are, strangely, 
not satisfied at all with the Fisheries Agreement, and that the Taiwanese fish-
ermen have harvested more than they used to from these fisheries, causing 
more trouble in terms of competing fisheries with the Japanese fishermen.90
 One cannot easily judge, in an actual life, whose benefit the bilateral 
agreement will bring about. More current data is needed to make a fair evalu-
ation of the result of concluding the 2013 Fisheries Agreement. What should 
be noted here is that regardless of the superficial success in concluding a fish-
eries agreement, the voice of the Japanese fishermen was not reflected in the 
agreement, and that in the face of diplomatic difficulties with China regarding 
the territorial dispute over the Islands, for the sake of appearance, Japan dared 
to take the nominal fruit of concluding a bilateral agreement in order to check 
China diplomatically and strategically. 
 The operation of a fisheries agreement may be negatively influenced by 
a breakdown in diplomatic talks between the parties concerned due to other, 
different bilateral matters. Due to the territorial dispute over the Takeshima/
Dokdo islands,91 Japan and South Korea, in spite of the current bilateral fish-
ing agreement concluded in 1999, could not do anything but take the unusual 
step to prohibit each other’s fishing boats from operating in their respective 
EEZs, failing to reach an agreement over quotas and other issues for various 
reasons.92 【MAP 4】 It has been reported that tensions over historical and 
other issues may have dimmed the prospects for a swift recovery to ordinary 
relations.93 The 1999 fishing agreement has been regarded as a successful 
result of diplomatic talks between the two by way of shelving the difficult ter-
ritorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands.94 The direct beneficiaries, 
practically speaking, are the fishermen of each party to the agreement, but 
they are at the same time, the direct victims of the act of their state.
 Therefore, a diplomatically acrobatic agreement of this kind may be 
hampered by consequent issues between its two parties, irrespective of the will 
and intention of the private parties directly concerned. Particularly in East 
Asia, history recognition and the reminiscence of the Second World War are 
still sensitive and unresolved issues for China and South Korea, among others, 
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including territorial issues.95 It seems evident that the law of the sea cannot in 
itself solve practical issues. 
 In this sense, the handling or mishandling of a minor independent inci-
dent may tend to lead to an unexpectedly disastrous outcome, such as the in-
cident of September 2010, in which a Japanese coast guard vessel was rammed 
by a Chinese fishing trawler while trying to detain the trawler for illegally 
fishing in the waters surrounding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Tiaoyutai 
Islands.96 In accordance with Japan’s Letter of the Foreign Minister regard-
ing the Waters Prescribed in Article 6 （b） of the 1997 Fisheries Agreement 
between Japan and China,97 the Japanese government was expected to be flex-
ible enough to avoid applying Japan’s domestic laws and regulations related to 
fisheries with regard to the Chinese nationals on the trawler.98 In fact, how-
ever, Japan’s coast guard arrested and detained the captain of the trawler and 
its crew for obstructing executive officers from performing their duty.99
 It should also be mentioned that, in exchange for Japan’s Letter 
【MAP ４】
［Source］http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/sakaiminato/sigen/zanntei.html
 (accessed 30 September 2014)
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mentioned above,100 China also issued a Letter in the name of Chinese 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in exactly identical words and 
form. It is assumed that the effect of the exchange of these Letters between 
these two states was not to cause any trouble with respect to each party’s 
position regarding territorial sovereignty over the disputed Islands by way of 
the prior agreement on non-application of each party’s laws and regulations 
related to fisheries to the other party’s nationals. These facts, therefore, can be 
deemed to mean that, basically, both parties to the 1997 Fisheries Agreement 
had been in tacit agreement with the recognition that there existed a territo-
rial dispute over the Islands.
 Unfortunately, however, the accumulation of certain unexpected and in-
evitable situations and matters on each side may cause unforeseeable and dev-
astating consequences. Simply maintaining and applying existing legal rules 
and regulations under the law of the sea will not be enough to maintain and 
enhance bilateral and regional relations of peace and friendship. 
Conclusions
 This paper draws the following conclusions from the discussion above: 
First, the law of the sea, including UNCLOS, is not perfect to settle all mari-
time conflicts and disputes in the East and South China Seas between the 
states concerned, let alone the territorial disputes. This is because China, as a 
returning rather than rising power, may act as a challenger against the status 
quo. Considering the regional and historical peculiarities, one cannot easily 
continue to think that the status quo is and will be best for every country in 
this region. As far as the new relationship between the powers is yet to be de-
fined and its impact to the regional political, economic, and military environ-
ment is uncertain, international maritime law, including UNCLOS, will be 
open to controversial and unstable interpretation and application, in reality.
 Second, the law of the sea does not directly and precisely govern his-
torical matters, such as historic waters and historical rights. The defence often 
offered by the writers who support China’s position that UNCLOS does not 
apply to matters that precede UNCLOS is open for discussion, since its posi-
tion as a ‘civilization state’ with a long history is not comparable to any other 
states, western or eastern, in terms of the territorial and maritime disputes. 
63
Waseda Global Forum No. 11, 2014, 47－73
Regional and geographical peculiarities will also further entangle the situa-
tion. Conditions in the East China Sea, for example, are still under the strong 
influence of the reminiscence of the Second World War. Confidence-building 
measures must be taken among the parties concerned in this region as soon as 
possible.
  Third, it is fundamental that, in order to settle a territorial and mari-
time dispute, peaceful and direct talks between the parties concerned should 
be a basic threshold. Other countries should not interrupt or hamper their 
efforts to create the conditions suitable for their direct talks. This can be true 
with the situations in the Est China Sea and the South China Sea. Even un-
der the compulsory settlement of disputes within the UNCLOS framework 
by way of arbitration, unilateral institution of the arbitral procedure, for exam-
ple, will not be very fruitful in the long run for the real solution of the dispute 
in the South China Sea region.101 In other words, a plan of containment or 
isolation of China will not work under current circumstances. A long perspec-
tive and effort to make and nurture confidence among the parties concerned 
should be sought, as there is no short cut for this issue.102 
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